[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 297-317

Título :	Post-phronetic pain
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Fecha de publicación:	2022
Artículo en la página:	p. 297-317
Idioma :	Inglés
Temas:	EMOCIONES FILOSOFIA ARISTOTELICA MORAL SABIDURIA TRISTEZA
Resumen:	The aim of this article is to refute the standard assumption in Aristotelian virtue theory that a fully phronetic decision is characterised by psychological unity and freedom from ambivalent emotions eliciting post-phronetic pain (PPP). After introducing the topic, the second section rehearses the structure of an argument showing that the absence of non-optimal emotions after a phronetic decision creates a mystery for Aristotelian virtue theory. The third section examines four different (but ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to save Aristotle’s face, by defanging the non-PPP assumption from within his virtue theory. The fourth section delineates the nature of the PPP by arguing that it comprises a number of distinguishable emotions of moral sadness. The final section probes a number of resources within neo-Aristotelian theory that would allow us to reconceptualise PPP as beneficial to a certain extent, without fetishising it as a pure blessing in disguise.
Nota de contenido:	Introduction -- The mistery of the missing motivation -- Some possible aristotelian rejoinders -- Types of moral sadness -- Does PPP have any redeeming features? -- Acknowledgments.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101805

[artículo] Post-phronetic pain [texto impreso] . - 2022 . - p. 297-317.
Idioma : Inglés
in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 297-317

Temas:	EMOCIONES FILOSOFIA ARISTOTELICA MORAL SABIDURIA TRISTEZA
Resumen:	The aim of this article is to refute the standard assumption in Aristotelian virtue theory that a fully phronetic decision is characterised by psychological unity and freedom from ambivalent emotions eliciting post-phronetic pain (PPP). After introducing the topic, the second section rehearses the structure of an argument showing that the absence of non-optimal emotions after a phronetic decision creates a mystery for Aristotelian virtue theory. The third section examines four different (but ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to save Aristotle’s face, by defanging the non-PPP assumption from within his virtue theory. The fourth section delineates the nature of the PPP by arguing that it comprises a number of distinguishable emotions of moral sadness. The final section probes a number of resources within neo-Aristotelian theory that would allow us to reconceptualise PPP as beneficial to a certain extent, without fetishising it as a pure blessing in disguise.
Nota de contenido:	Introduction -- The mistery of the missing motivation -- Some possible aristotelian rejoinders -- Types of moral sadness -- Does PPP have any redeeming features? -- Acknowledgments.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101805