[artículo] | Título : | Il "rapporto della sostanzialità" in Hegel | | Tipo de documento: | texto impreso | | Autores: | Dario Sacchi | | Fecha de publicación: | 2022 | | Artículo en la página: | p. 81-94 | | Idioma : | Italiano | | Resumen: | The “Relation of Substantiality” in Hegel · According to Hegel, the logical connection between substance and accidents is especially suitable for rendering both the relation between finite and infinite (one and many, absoluteness and relativity, and so on) and the structure of logical mediation through which we can arrive at Absolute Knowledge. Moreover, he thinks that even the connection between cause and effect is well-founded only if it is meant to be translatable as a nexus between substance and accidents. So, Spinoza’s Monism would seem to be validated by Hegel, but Substance in the Spinozian approach is not a genuinely active being. On the contrary, Leibniz’s view of substance as a centre of perceptual and volitional activity would be undoubtedly preferable, yet his Pluralism is unacceptable. | | Nota de contenido: | Rilievi introduttivi -- La cosa e le sue propietà come determinazione immediata dell'esistenza -- Sostanza e accidenti nel "rapporto assoluto" -- Conclusione. | | Enlace permanente a este registro: | https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101825 |
in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.1 (2022) . - p. 81-94
[artículo] Il "rapporto della sostanzialità" in Hegel [texto impreso] / Dario Sacchi . - 2022 . - p. 81-94. Idioma : Italiano in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.1 (2022) . - p. 81-94 | Resumen: | The “Relation of Substantiality” in Hegel · According to Hegel, the logical connection between substance and accidents is especially suitable for rendering both the relation between finite and infinite (one and many, absoluteness and relativity, and so on) and the structure of logical mediation through which we can arrive at Absolute Knowledge. Moreover, he thinks that even the connection between cause and effect is well-founded only if it is meant to be translatable as a nexus between substance and accidents. So, Spinoza’s Monism would seem to be validated by Hegel, but Substance in the Spinozian approach is not a genuinely active being. On the contrary, Leibniz’s view of substance as a centre of perceptual and volitional activity would be undoubtedly preferable, yet his Pluralism is unacceptable. | | Nota de contenido: | Rilievi introduttivi -- La cosa e le sue propietà come determinazione immediata dell'esistenza -- Sostanza e accidenti nel "rapporto assoluto" -- Conclusione. | | Enlace permanente a este registro: | https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101825 |
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Il "rapporto della sostanzialità" in Hegel en Acta Philosophica, v.31, n.1 (2022)