Research Network Working Paper, 399. Subnational goverment bailouts in OECD countries / Jürgen Von Hagen 

Público ISBD Título de serie: Research Network Working Paper, 399 Título : Subnational goverment bailouts in OECD countries : four case studies Tipo de documento: texto impreso Autores: Jürgen Von Hagen Editorial: Washington : Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Fecha de publicación: 2000 Número de páginas: 36 p Idioma : Inglés Temas: BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO OCDE PAISES Clasificación: 338.9 Resumen: We present four case studies of bailouts of subnational governments in Australia, Germany, Italy and Sweden. The case studies show that bailouts can occur in a diverse set of institutions shaping the relations between central and subnational governments. Surpisingly, there is little evidence in favor of the 'too big to fail' argument explaining bailouts. In contrast, elements of political favoritism play some role in most cases. The cases also indicate the importance of properly designing principal-agent relationships in the decentralization of public finances. Constitutional mandates for uniform provision of public services and attempts by the central government to dominate subnational governments in matters of fiscal policy seem to be conducive to bailouts. En línea: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=788048 Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=72894 Research Network Working Paper, 399. Subnational goverment bailouts in OECD countries : four case studies [texto impreso] / Jürgen Von Hagen . - Washington : Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 2000 . - 36 p. Idioma : Inglés Temas: BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO OCDE PAISES Clasificación: 338.9 Resumen: We present four case studies of bailouts of subnational governments in Australia, Germany, Italy and Sweden. The case studies show that bailouts can occur in a diverse set of institutions shaping the relations between central and subnational governments. Surpisingly, there is little evidence in favor of the 'too big to fail' argument explaining bailouts. In contrast, elements of political favoritism play some role in most cases. The cases also indicate the importance of properly designing principal-agent relationships in the decentralization of public finances. Constitutional mandates for uniform provision of public services and attempts by the central government to dominate subnational governments in matters of fiscal policy seem to be conducive to bailouts. En línea: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=788048 Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=72894

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Inventario	Ubicación en el estante	Tipo de medio	Sección	Ubicación	Estado
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