Research Network Working Paper, 429. Enforcement, contract design, and default / Alexander Monge N. 

Público ISBD Título de serie: Research Network Working Paper, 429 Título : Enforcement, contract design, and default : exploring the financial markets of Costa Rica Tipo de documento: texto impreso Autores: Alexander Monge N. ; Javier Cascante ; Luis J. Hall Editorial: Washington : Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Fecha de publicación: 2001 Número de páginas: 44 p Idioma : Inglés Temas: BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO COSTA RICA MERCADO FINANCIERO Clasificación: 338.9 Resumen: This paper examines the institutional determinants of incentives to repay in Costa Rica and their effects on defaults and the design of financial contracts. Enforcement mechanisms help to determine how much is paid back to creditors and how much shareholders receive as dividends. Theoretically, however, the most important effects will be on the observable characteristics of contracts, as rational agents foresee the incentives of other parties. As courts enforce contracts and punish defaulters, they determine the form contracts take and the magnitude and direction of investments. The paper contains findings on the practices of financial intermediaries that are discussed in the context of contract theory, with a focus on the formal financial intermediaries that are scattered throughout the country. Much of the information comes from primary sources, including a sample of almost 1,700 civil trials and a detailed survey on the credit policies of 31 intermediaries. This paper reviews the creditor-borrower relationship at all stages—ex ante, interim, and ex post. The evidence supports the importance of collateral and other ex post repayment incentives. The evidence also suggests that, contrary to the common view, banks are not passive lenders. They remain alert to how well projects perform and rely on previous experience and a rather sophisticated informational network in granting credit. En línea: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=788057 Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=73040 Research Network Working Paper, 429. Enforcement, contract design, and default : exploring the financial markets of Costa Rica [texto impreso] / Alexander Monge N. ; Javier Cascante ; Luis J. Hall . - Washington : Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 2001 . - 44 p. Idioma : Inglés Temas: BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO COSTA RICA MERCADO FINANCIERO Clasificación: 338.9 Resumen: This paper examines the institutional determinants of incentives to repay in Costa Rica and their effects on defaults and the design of financial contracts. Enforcement mechanisms help to determine how much is paid back to creditors and how much shareholders receive as dividends. Theoretically, however, the most important effects will be on the observable characteristics of contracts, as rational agents foresee the incentives of other parties. As courts enforce contracts and punish defaulters, they determine the form contracts take and the magnitude and direction of investments. The paper contains findings on the practices of financial intermediaries that are discussed in the context of contract theory, with a focus on the formal financial intermediaries that are scattered throughout the country. Much of the information comes from primary sources, including a sample of almost 1,700 civil trials and a detailed survey on the credit policies of 31 intermediaries. This paper reviews the creditor-borrower relationship at all stages—ex ante, interim, and ex post. The evidence supports the importance of collateral and other ex post repayment incentives. The evidence also suggests that, contrary to the common view, banks are not passive lenders. They remain alert to how well projects perform and rely on previous experience and a rather sophisticated informational network in granting credit. En línea: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=788057 Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=73040

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Inventario	Ubicación en el estante	Tipo de medio	Sección	Ubicación	Estado
038437	338.9 RES v.429	Libro	Colección	Biblioteca Central	Disponible

Research Network Working Paper, 475. Bailouts in Costa Rica as a result of government centralization and discretionary transfers / Luis J. Hall 

Público ISBD Título de serie: Research Network Working Paper, 475 Título : Bailouts in Costa Rica as a result of government centralization and discretionary transfers Tipo de documento: texto impreso Autores: Luis J. Hall ; Gilberto E. Arce ; Alexander Monge N. Editorial: Washington : Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Fecha de publicación: 2002 Número de páginas: 50 p Idioma : Inglés Temas: ASPECTOS FISCALES BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO COSTA RICA DEUDA PUBLICA GOBIERNO GOBIERNO LOCAL Clasificación: 338.9 Resumen: This paper investigates the inter-relation between the central government and the municipalities in Costa Rica. It examines episodes in which the central government has bailed out the local governments from their obligations. We employ empirical and descriptive methods to show how discretionary grants relate to the degree of fiscal discipline of the municipality to produce hidden bailouts. Political, demographic, and economic variables explain the allocation of these discretionary transfers. We illustrate the effects of the high concentration of decision-making of the central government on the fiscal performance of the municipalities. The municipalities play a limited role and its functioning largely depends upon the central government. We argue that the national administration would face a high political cost if it did not bail out the local government in several of the episodes studied. Using panel data from 1982-1997 on 81 cantones, we find that the fiscal effort of the local government is reduced by the presence of discretionary grants. The local governments finance local expenses with these discretionary transfers according to our empirical results. As expected from the centralization issue, political variables such as the affiliation of the local administration have significant effects on the resources received by the municipalities. En línea: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=788101 Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=72968 Research Network Working Paper, 475. Bailouts in Costa Rica as a result of government centralization and discretionary transfers [texto impreso] / Luis J. Hall ; Gilberto E. Arce ; Alexander Monge N. . - Washington : Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 2002 . - 50 p. Idioma : Inglés Temas: ASPECTOS FISCALES BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO COSTA RICA DEUDA PUBLICA GOBIERNO GOBIERNO LOCAL Clasificación: 338.9 Resumen: This paper investigates the inter-relation between the central government and the municipalities in Costa Rica. It examines episodes in which the central government has bailed out the local governments from their obligations. We employ empirical and descriptive methods to show how discretionary grants relate to the degree of fiscal discipline of the municipality to produce hidden bailouts. Political, demographic, and economic variables explain the allocation of these discretionary transfers. We illustrate the effects of the high concentration of decision-making of the central government on the fiscal performance of the municipalities. The municipalities play a limited role and its functioning largely depends upon the central government. We argue that the national administration would face a high political cost if it did not bail out the local government in several of the episodes studied. Using panel data from 1982-1997 on 81 cantones, we find that the fiscal effort of the local government is reduced by the presence of discretionary grants. The local governments finance local expenses with these discretionary transfers according to our empirical results. As expected from the centralization issue, political variables such as the affiliation of the local administration have significant effects on the resources received by the municipalities. En línea: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=788101 Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=72968

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Inventario	Ubicación en el estante	Tipo de medio	Sección	Ubicación	Estado
038369	338.9 RES v.475	Libro	Colección	Biblioteca Central	Disponible

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