Research Network Working Paper, 447. Fiscal decentralization in Mexico / Fausto Hernández Trillo 

Público ISBD Título de serie: Research Network Working Paper, 447 Título : Fiscal decentralization in Mexico : the bailout problem Tipo de documento: texto impreso Autores: Fausto Hernández Trillo ; Alberto Díaz Cayeros ; Rafael Gamboa González Editorial: Washington : Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Fecha de publicación: 2002 Número de páginas: 54 p Idioma : Inglés Temas: ASPECTOS FISCALES BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO CRISIS FINANCIERA DESCENTRALIZACION GUBERNAMENTAL DEUDA PUBLICA GOBIERNO LOCAL MEXICO Clasificación: 338.9 Resumen: The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze the determinants and consequences of bailing out states, in particular, those observed in Mexico. This work suggests that the explicit generalized bailout carried out by the federal government in Mexico in 1995 created a moral hazard problem. Another result of the analysis is that the existing institutional-legal framework is not adequate, since it provides incentives for states to borrow and for banks to lend without evaluating the risk of the project. Likewise, the importance of the state is a major determinant in providing bailout transfers. Also, the more fiscal need a state government has when the state government is incapable of adjusting its expenditure, the more likely the state to get an extraordinary transfer during the period of study. On the other hand, political variables are not an important determinant of a bailout, except, perhaps, when there are state elections. It is also shown that excessive indebtedness of local states may have equity implications as well: bailouts tend to be highly regressive, as the poorer—and less indebted—states receive much less in extraordinary resources. En línea: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=788074 Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=73044 Research Network Working Paper, 447. Fiscal decentralization in Mexico : the bailout problem [texto impreso] / Fausto Hernández Trillo ; Alberto Díaz Cayeros ; Rafael Gamboa González . - Washington : Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 2002 . - 54 p. Idioma : Inglés Temas: ASPECTOS FISCALES BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO CRISIS FINANCIERA DESCENTRALIZACION GUBERNAMENTAL DEUDA PUBLICA GOBIERNO LOCAL MEXICO Clasificación: 338.9 Resumen: The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze the determinants and consequences of bailing out states, in particular, those observed in Mexico. This work suggests that the explicit generalized bailout carried out by the federal government in Mexico in 1995 created a moral hazard problem. Another result of the analysis is that the existing institutional-legal framework is not adequate, since it provides incentives for states to borrow and for banks to lend without evaluating the risk of the project. Likewise, the importance of the state is a major determinant in providing bailout transfers. Also, the more fiscal need a state government has when the state government is incapable of adjusting its expenditure, the more likely the state to get an extraordinary transfer during the period of study. On the other hand, political variables are not an important determinant of a bailout, except, perhaps, when there are state elections. It is also shown that excessive indebtedness of local states may have equity implications as well: bailouts tend to be highly regressive, as the poorer—and less indebted—states receive much less in extraordinary resources. En línea: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=788074 Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=73044

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Inventario	Ubicación en el estante	Tipo de medio	Sección	Ubicación	Estado
038445	338.9 RES v.447	Libro	Colección	Biblioteca Central	Disponible

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