Conocimiento por connaturalidad y conocimiento jurídico / Pedro Rivas en Acta Philosophica, v.30, n.2 (2021)

Público ISBD [artículo]  inActa Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 377-395 Título : Conocimiento por connaturalidad y conocimiento jurídico Tipo de documento: texto impreso Autores: Pedro Rivas Fecha de publicación: 2021 Artículo en la página: p. 377-395 Idioma : Español Temas: DERECHO RAZONAMIENTO Resumen: Connatural and Legal Knowledge - First, this article tries to establish that practical reasoning includes at least one nondiscursive element. Second, the article makes the case that while that element is not discursive in nature, it is not irrational. In this sense, legal reasoning, as an example of practical, prudential judgment in this case, will also have non-discursive elements or moments. In this work we are referring to something that occurs at the level of affectivity, of appetites, whose act is called love, in a much more general sense than we commonly use. Affectivity affects the will although it is always ultimately indeterminate. But affectivity inclines it. It is now a question of considering how this inclination has an important effect on practical knowledge when it judges, because affectivity presents a certain good with intensity. That is why it is called judgment by inclination, affectivity, which is connaturalized with the object and so presented to the intellect. How such a thing occurs is what we are going to try to explain. Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101195 [artículo] Conocimiento por connaturalidad y conocimiento jurídico [texto impreso] / Pedro Rivas . - 2021 . - p. 377-395. Idioma : Español in Acta Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 377-395 Temas: DERECHO RAZONAMIENTO Resumen: Connatural and Legal Knowledge - First, this article tries to establish that practical reasoning includes at least one nondiscursive element. Second, the article makes the case that while that element is not discursive in nature, it is not irrational. In this sense, legal reasoning, as an example of practical, prudential judgment in this case, will also have non-discursive elements or moments. In this work we are referring to something that occurs at the level of affectivity, of appetites, whose act is called love, in a much more general sense than we commonly use. Affectivity affects the will although it is always ultimately indeterminate. But affectivity inclines it. It is now a question of considering how this inclination has an important effect on practical knowledge when it judges, because affectivity presents a certain good with intensity. That is why it is called judgment by inclination, affectivity, which is connaturalized with the object and so presented to the intellect. How such a thing occurs is what we are going to try to explain. Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101195

---

page 1/1