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Autor Gabriela Rossi |
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Las partes del alma y la relación entre razón y emocionalidad en la virtud aristotélica / Gabriela Rossi en Acta Philosophica, v.31, n.1 (2022)
[artículo]
Título : Las partes del alma y la relación entre razón y emocionalidad en la virtud aristotélica Tipo de documento: texto impreso Autores: Gabriela Rossi Fecha de publicación: 2022 Artículo en la página: p. 119-141 Idioma : Español Resumen: Parts of the Soul and the Relation between Reason and Emotionality in Aristotelian Virtue · I take as a starting point the distinction made by Aristotle in NE I 13 between two functions of the soul that take part in reason, and I argue that both are proper of the human soul (i.e. not shared as such with other non-rational animals). My further aim is to emphasize the integration of emotions and reason in Aristotle’s practical rationality, against dualistic readings of the Aristotelian ethical virtue, that segregate the functions of reason and sensibility. Thus, I defend that reason has a direct influence on emotions, although this influence is not to be understood, as some authors suggest, as a rhetorical persuasion. Instead, the goal of early ethical education would be to make the non-rational part receptive to the mandates of reason. Nota de contenido: Introducción -- Las partes del alma humana -- Escuchar y obedecer a la razón (I) -- Escuchar y obedecer a la razón (II) -- Conclusiones. Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101828
in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.1 (2022) . - p. 119-141[artículo] Las partes del alma y la relación entre razón y emocionalidad en la virtud aristotélica [texto impreso] / Gabriela Rossi . - 2022 . - p. 119-141.
Idioma : Español
in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.1 (2022) . - p. 119-141
Resumen: Parts of the Soul and the Relation between Reason and Emotionality in Aristotelian Virtue · I take as a starting point the distinction made by Aristotle in NE I 13 between two functions of the soul that take part in reason, and I argue that both are proper of the human soul (i.e. not shared as such with other non-rational animals). My further aim is to emphasize the integration of emotions and reason in Aristotle’s practical rationality, against dualistic readings of the Aristotelian ethical virtue, that segregate the functions of reason and sensibility. Thus, I defend that reason has a direct influence on emotions, although this influence is not to be understood, as some authors suggest, as a rhetorical persuasion. Instead, the goal of early ethical education would be to make the non-rational part receptive to the mandates of reason. Nota de contenido: Introducción -- Las partes del alma humana -- Escuchar y obedecer a la razón (I) -- Escuchar y obedecer a la razón (II) -- Conclusiones. Enlace permanente a este registro: https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101828