[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 227-252

Título :	Social psychology theories, unity of virtues and reasonableness
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Michele Mangini
Fecha de publicación:	2021
Artículo en la página:	p. 227-252
Idioma :	Inglés
Temas:	PSICOLOGIA SOCIAL RAZON VIRTUDES
Resumen:	The standard of reasonableness and ‘the reasonable person standard’ enjoy a wide legal and political use but their origin is, in my view, within the ethics of virtues. The virtues refer to an ideal agent, useful for evaluations of human conduct. Certain theories in social psychology propose views which undermine the use of virtues in daily life. I believe that common practical reasoning leaves more room to virtue-concepts than what theories such as ‘Mixed Traits theory’ allow. If the argument is plausible we also have good reasons to hold the ‘unity of virtues’ (UV) thesis as a thesis which is conducive to integrate the concerns of different virtues, deflating conflicts. In our increasingly conflictual age UV seems required by reasonableness which, in turn, shows its importance for human flourishing.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101185

[artículo] Social psychology theories, unity of virtues and reasonableness [texto impreso] / Michele Mangini . - 2021 . - p. 227-252.
Idioma : Inglés
in Acta Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 227-252

Temas:	PSICOLOGIA SOCIAL RAZON VIRTUDES
Resumen:	The standard of reasonableness and ‘the reasonable person standard’ enjoy a wide legal and political use but their origin is, in my view, within the ethics of virtues. The virtues refer to an ideal agent, useful for evaluations of human conduct. Certain theories in social psychology propose views which undermine the use of virtues in daily life. I believe that common practical reasoning leaves more room to virtue-concepts than what theories such as ‘Mixed Traits theory’ allow. If the argument is plausible we also have good reasons to hold the ‘unity of virtues’ (UV) thesis as a thesis which is conducive to integrate the concerns of different virtues, deflating conflicts. In our increasingly conflictual age UV seems required by reasonableness which, in turn, shows its importance for human flourishing.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101185

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 251-272

Título :	Natural juridical goods : the juridical status of basic human goods in Aquina's jusnaturalist philosophy
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Petar Popovic
Fecha de publicación:	2021
Artículo en la página:	p. 251-272
Idioma :	Inglés
Temas:	DERECHO NATURAL FILOSOFIA TOMISTA
Resumen:	The article offers an analysis of the way to transcend the debates on the moral status of basic human goods in Thomistic natural-law theory, by starting from the common ground of both parties to the debate and then presenting a research on the status of human goods as juridical goods. The claim that natural rights are natural juridical goods is not only profoundly Thomistic; it also contains elements of a fully-fledged juridical line of argument. Without the passage from the moral status of the basic human goods to their juridical status, the legality of the natural law would be seen as inherently non-juridical. The article concludes by claiming that Thomistic juridical realism establishes a bridge – between the moral “ought” and a conception of the juridical “ought” – on which rights are essentially seen not as subjective right-claims, but as the juridical goods of the other person.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101187

[artículo] Natural juridical goods : the juridical status of basic human goods in Aquina's jusnaturalist philosophy [texto impreso] / Petar Popovic . - 2021 . - p. 251-272.
Idioma : Inglés
in Acta Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 251-272

Temas:	DERECHO NATURAL FILOSOFIA TOMISTA
Resumen:	The article offers an analysis of the way to transcend the debates on the moral status of basic human goods in Thomistic natural-law theory, by starting from the common ground of both parties to the debate and then presenting a research on the status of human goods as juridical goods. The claim that natural rights are natural juridical goods is not only profoundly Thomistic; it also contains elements of a fully-fledged juridical line of argument. Without the passage from the moral status of the basic human goods to their juridical status, the legality of the natural law would be seen as inherently non-juridical. The article concludes by claiming that Thomistic juridical realism establishes a bridge – between the moral “ought” and a conception of the juridical “ought” – on which rights are essentially seen not as subjective right-claims, but as the juridical goods of the other person.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101187

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 273-295

Título :	Gadamer and Aquinas on language, being, and the beauty of truth
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Alice M. Ramos
Fecha de publicación:	2021
Artículo en la página:	p. 273-295
Idioma :	Inglés
Temas:	FILOSOFIA TOMISTA GADAMER, HANS GEORG LENGUAJE SER TOMAS DE AQUINO, SANTO VERDAD
Nota de contenido:	In this article my intention will be to consider briefly how Aquinas’s discussion of the interior word serves as an analogy for the intelligible emanation of the Word from God. Creation through the Word explains the truth of things, as well as their beauty and light. Had Gadamer been more sympathetic to Thomistic thought in its original texts and not simply in what he considered to be “the dogmatic overlay superimposed on Aristotle... by Neo-Thomism,” he would have perhaps seen in Aquinas an ally in his recovery of the truth of things. I will relate the expressive character of language to being, as is found in Gadamer’s own exposition, and I will insist on the beauty of being and its light. I also refer at some length to the light of nous and of the agent intellect, which are simply mentioned by Gadamer without further development. And finally, I will end this article with a consideration of truth, whose manifestation is related to the light of beauty. Truth is explained as an event and as light.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101189

[artículo] Gadamer and Aquinas on language, being, and the beauty of truth [texto impreso] / Alice M. Ramos . - 2021 . - p. 273-295.
Idioma : Inglés
in Acta Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 273-295

Temas:	FILOSOFIA TOMISTA GADAMER, HANS GEORG LENGUAJE SER TOMAS DE AQUINO, SANTO VERDAD
Nota de contenido:	In this article my intention will be to consider briefly how Aquinas’s discussion of the interior word serves as an analogy for the intelligible emanation of the Word from God. Creation through the Word explains the truth of things, as well as their beauty and light. Had Gadamer been more sympathetic to Thomistic thought in its original texts and not simply in what he considered to be “the dogmatic overlay superimposed on Aristotle... by Neo-Thomism,” he would have perhaps seen in Aquinas an ally in his recovery of the truth of things. I will relate the expressive character of language to being, as is found in Gadamer’s own exposition, and I will insist on the beauty of being and its light. I also refer at some length to the light of nous and of the agent intellect, which are simply mentioned by Gadamer without further development. And finally, I will end this article with a consideration of truth, whose manifestation is related to the light of beauty. Truth is explained as an event and as light.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101189

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 297-319

Título :	¿Refuta el "teísmo escéptico" el argumento ateológico inductivo a partir del mal?
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Enrique Romerales
Fecha de publicación:	2021
Artículo en la página:	p. 297-319
Idioma :	Español
Temas:	ESCEPTICISMO MAL (ETICA) MORAL TEISMO
Resumen:	Does Sceptical Theism Rebut the Atheological Inductive Argument from Evil? - Four decades ago, a debate started about the cogency of William Rowe’s inductive argument from evil: there probably are gratuitous evils; God would prevent the existence of gratuitous evils; therefore, probably God does not exist. This argument has deserved various responses from the sceptical theism arena. It is mainly objected that our knowledge of the realm of value, of the scope and global impact of actions and states of affairs, and finally of the divine reasons and designs is so precarious that we can draw no atheist conclusion from the apparently gratuitous suffering. Nevertheless, such approach has prompted several criticisms, most prominently the charge of leading into some moral scepticism that would paralyse our actions or, at least, would leave them unjustified. I recap here the essential contributions to this debate, assessing the arguments of either party, and I conclude that the charge of moral scepticism is well grounded. In addition, although the appearance of gratuitousness does not prove that such evils are genuinely so and should have been avoided by God, the mere appearance of pointless suffering, especially being so appalling, counts as an additional evil to be justified. Weighing all objections, I claim sceptical theism does not hold.
Nota de contenido:	Introducción: la trayectoria del argumento inductivo del mal de William Rowe -- El problema epistémico con la primera premisa -- El teísmo escéptico moderado -- La acusación de escepticismo moral -- El argumento del desamparo -- ¿El teísmo escéptico restrictivo fuerte al rescate? -- Conclusión.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101190

[artículo] ¿Refuta el "teísmo escéptico" el argumento ateológico inductivo a partir del mal? [texto impreso] / Enrique Romerales . - 2021 . - p. 297-319.
Idioma : Español
in Acta Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 297-319

Temas:	ESCEPTICISMO MAL (ETICA) MORAL TEISMO
Resumen:	Does Sceptical Theism Rebut the Atheological Inductive Argument from Evil? - Four decades ago, a debate started about the cogency of William Rowe’s inductive argument from evil: there probably are gratuitous evils; God would prevent the existence of gratuitous evils; therefore, probably God does not exist. This argument has deserved various responses from the sceptical theism arena. It is mainly objected that our knowledge of the realm of value, of the scope and global impact of actions and states of affairs, and finally of the divine reasons and designs is so precarious that we can draw no atheist conclusion from the apparently gratuitous suffering. Nevertheless, such approach has prompted several criticisms, most prominently the charge of leading into some moral scepticism that would paralyse our actions or, at least, would leave them unjustified. I recap here the essential contributions to this debate, assessing the arguments of either party, and I conclude that the charge of moral scepticism is well grounded. In addition, although the appearance of gratuitousness does not prove that such evils are genuinely so and should have been avoided by God, the mere appearance of pointless suffering, especially being so appalling, counts as an additional evil to be justified. Weighing all objections, I claim sceptical theism does not hold.
Nota de contenido:	Introducción: la trayectoria del argumento inductivo del mal de William Rowe -- El problema epistémico con la primera premisa -- El teísmo escéptico moderado -- La acusación de escepticismo moral -- El argumento del desamparo -- ¿El teísmo escéptico restrictivo fuerte al rescate? -- Conclusión.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101190

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 323-342

Título :	Realism, democratic accountability, and neo-aristotelianism : reading Macintyre as a political realist
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Caleb Bernacchio
Fecha de publicación:	2021
Artículo en la página:	p. 323-342
Idioma :	Inglés
Temas:	DEMOCRACIA FILOSOFIA POLITICA LIBERALISMO MACINTYRE, ALASDAIR TEORIA POLITICA
Resumen:	MacIntyre’s criticisms of liberalism are well known but his constructive political philosophy is less widely appreciated. In this article, I outline MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian political theory by situating it in relationship to both Jeremy Waldron’s account of democratic accountability and the political realism of Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss. MacIntyre shares Waldron’s concern that political institutions be accountable to ordinary political agents but he avoids the latter’s moralism by viewing democratic accountability as a structural feature of the relationship between practices and institutions. Likewise, MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism has much in common with that of Williams but MacIntyre differs from Williams in rejecting the latter’s view of political legitimacy as centered upon provisions of societal order and security. In contrast, MacIntyre’s approach is similar to Geuss’s account of political realism except that MacIntyre gives a much greater role to virtues and moral norms generated within locally delineated practices as key factors facilitating political action. In this sense, MacIntyre’s theory of political can be called a virtue realism.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101191

[artículo] Realism, democratic accountability, and neo-aristotelianism : reading Macintyre as a political realist [texto impreso] / Caleb Bernacchio . - 2021 . - p. 323-342.
Idioma : Inglés
in Acta Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 323-342

Temas:	DEMOCRACIA FILOSOFIA POLITICA LIBERALISMO MACINTYRE, ALASDAIR TEORIA POLITICA
Resumen:	MacIntyre’s criticisms of liberalism are well known but his constructive political philosophy is less widely appreciated. In this article, I outline MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian political theory by situating it in relationship to both Jeremy Waldron’s account of democratic accountability and the political realism of Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss. MacIntyre shares Waldron’s concern that political institutions be accountable to ordinary political agents but he avoids the latter’s moralism by viewing democratic accountability as a structural feature of the relationship between practices and institutions. Likewise, MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism has much in common with that of Williams but MacIntyre differs from Williams in rejecting the latter’s view of political legitimacy as centered upon provisions of societal order and security. In contrast, MacIntyre’s approach is similar to Geuss’s account of political realism except that MacIntyre gives a much greater role to virtues and moral norms generated within locally delineated practices as key factors facilitating political action. In this sense, MacIntyre’s theory of political can be called a virtue realism.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101191

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 343-358

Título :	Il problema della divine hiddenness alla prova del concetto di dio
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Roberto Di Ceglie
Fecha de publicación:	2021
Artículo en la página:	p. 343-358
Idioma :	Italiano
Temas:	DIOS EXISTENCIA FILOSOFIA SCHELLENBERG, JOHN (1959-)
Resumen:	Divine Hiddenness and the Concept of God - In contemporary debates, the problem of divine hiddenness can be numbered among the most prominent atheistic arguments. In this essay, I focus on a widely discussed version of this argument, i.e., the one developed by John Schellenberg (1959-). He bases the version at stake on a concept of God as an omnipotent, morally perfect, and ontologically perfect being. I argue that the way he develops his argument is simply inconsistent with each of these concepts. As a result, Schellenberg’s version of the divine hiddenness argument proves to be implausible.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101193

[artículo] Il problema della divine hiddenness alla prova del concetto di dio [texto impreso] / Roberto Di Ceglie . - 2021 . - p. 343-358.
Idioma : Italiano
in Acta Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 343-358

Temas:	DIOS EXISTENCIA FILOSOFIA SCHELLENBERG, JOHN (1959-)
Resumen:	Divine Hiddenness and the Concept of God - In contemporary debates, the problem of divine hiddenness can be numbered among the most prominent atheistic arguments. In this essay, I focus on a widely discussed version of this argument, i.e., the one developed by John Schellenberg (1959-). He bases the version at stake on a concept of God as an omnipotent, morally perfect, and ontologically perfect being. I argue that the way he develops his argument is simply inconsistent with each of these concepts. As a result, Schellenberg’s version of the divine hiddenness argument proves to be implausible.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101193

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 359-375

Título :	La bondad divina y el evil-god challenge
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Rubén Pereda
Fecha de publicación:	2021
Artículo en la página:	p. 359-375
Idioma :	Español
Temas:	BIEN (ETICA) DIOS EXISTENCIA LAW, STEPHEN MAL (ETICA)
Resumen:	Divine Goodness and the evil-god challenge - Stephen Law has authored the evil-god challenge, i.e., the possibility of a completely evil god as a challenge for theistic philosophers; this challenge is grounded on the absence of a plausible proof of God’s good moral character. This paper calibrates the accuracy of the evil-god challenge when faced with Barry Miller’s strategy to elaborate on divine attributes.
Nota de contenido:	El evid-god challenge -- Una estrategia para predicar propiedades de Dios -- Un carácter moralmente bueno -- La bondad divina -- Conclusión.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101194

[artículo] La bondad divina y el evil-god challenge [texto impreso] / Rubén Pereda . - 2021 . - p. 359-375.
Idioma : Español
in Acta Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 359-375

Temas:	BIEN (ETICA) DIOS EXISTENCIA LAW, STEPHEN MAL (ETICA)
Resumen:	Divine Goodness and the evil-god challenge - Stephen Law has authored the evil-god challenge, i.e., the possibility of a completely evil god as a challenge for theistic philosophers; this challenge is grounded on the absence of a plausible proof of God’s good moral character. This paper calibrates the accuracy of the evil-god challenge when faced with Barry Miller’s strategy to elaborate on divine attributes.
Nota de contenido:	El evid-god challenge -- Una estrategia para predicar propiedades de Dios -- Un carácter moralmente bueno -- La bondad divina -- Conclusión.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101194

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 377-395

Título :	Conocimiento por connaturalidad y conocimiento jurídico
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Pedro Rivas
Fecha de publicación:	2021
Artículo en la página:	p. 377-395
Idioma :	Español
Temas:	DERECHO RAZONAMIENTO
Resumen:	Connatural and Legal Knowledge - First, this article tries to establish that practical reasoning includes at least one nondiscursive element. Second, the article makes the case that while that element is not discursive in nature, it is not irrational. In this sense, legal reasoning, as an example of practical, prudential judgment in this case, will also have non-discursive elements or moments. In this work we are referring to something that occurs at the level of affectivity, of appetites, whose act is called love, in a much more general sense than we commonly use. Affectivity affects the will although it is always ultimately indeterminate. But affectivity inclines it. It is now a question of considering how this inclination has an important effect on practical knowledge when it judges, because affectivity presents a certain good with intensity. That is why it is called judgment by inclination, affectivity, which is connaturalized with the object and so presented to the intellect. How such a thing occurs is what we are going to try to explain.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101195

[artículo] Conocimiento por connaturalidad y conocimiento jurídico [texto impreso] / Pedro Rivas . - 2021 . - p. 377-395.
Idioma : Español
in Acta Philosophica > v.30, n.2 (2021) . - p. 377-395

Temas:	DERECHO RAZONAMIENTO
Resumen:	Connatural and Legal Knowledge - First, this article tries to establish that practical reasoning includes at least one nondiscursive element. Second, the article makes the case that while that element is not discursive in nature, it is not irrational. In this sense, legal reasoning, as an example of practical, prudential judgment in this case, will also have non-discursive elements or moments. In this work we are referring to something that occurs at the level of affectivity, of appetites, whose act is called love, in a much more general sense than we commonly use. Affectivity affects the will although it is always ultimately indeterminate. But affectivity inclines it. It is now a question of considering how this inclination has an important effect on practical knowledge when it judges, because affectivity presents a certain good with intensity. That is why it is called judgment by inclination, affectivity, which is connaturalized with the object and so presented to the intellect. How such a thing occurs is what we are going to try to explain.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101195