[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 231-248

Título :	Levinas et le problème de l'autre. Autrement qu'être mis en question
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Cristóbal Balbontín Gallo
Fecha de publicación:	2022
Artículo en la página:	p. 231-248
Idioma :	Francés
Temas:	FILOSOFIA LEVINAS, EMMANUEL (1906-1995)
Resumen:	Jacques Derrida’s text Violence and Metaphysics is a decisive event not only in disseminating Levinas’ thought to the general public, but also in addressing the most important criticism Levinas experienced during his lifetime. It signals the changes in the axes and inflections that mark the passage from Totalité et infini to Autrement qu’être, his second great work. Autrement qu’être can therefore be read as Levinas’ effort to overcome the criticisms imposed by Jacques Derrida. Henceforth, Levinas will have to justify a more acute difference between the other and being than that of being and entity. But, in doing so, does this radicalization of the philosophy of the otherness not imply denying in turn the person of the other? It is precisely this that needs to be clarified.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101802

[artículo] Levinas et le problème de l'autre. Autrement qu'être mis en question [texto impreso] / Cristóbal Balbontín Gallo . - 2022 . - p. 231-248.
Idioma : Francés
in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 231-248

Temas:	FILOSOFIA LEVINAS, EMMANUEL (1906-1995)
Resumen:	Jacques Derrida’s text Violence and Metaphysics is a decisive event not only in disseminating Levinas’ thought to the general public, but also in addressing the most important criticism Levinas experienced during his lifetime. It signals the changes in the axes and inflections that mark the passage from Totalité et infini to Autrement qu’être, his second great work. Autrement qu’être can therefore be read as Levinas’ effort to overcome the criticisms imposed by Jacques Derrida. Henceforth, Levinas will have to justify a more acute difference between the other and being than that of being and entity. But, in doing so, does this radicalization of the philosophy of the otherness not imply denying in turn the person of the other? It is precisely this that needs to be clarified.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101802

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 249-271

Título :	El lenguaje moral en los diálogos socráticos
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Vianney Domingo
Fecha de publicación:	2022
Artículo en la página:	p. 249-271
Idioma :	Español
Temas:	CONOCIMIENTO FILOSOFIA GRIEGA SOCRATES VIRTUDES
Resumen:	In the Socratic Dialogues, as it is well known, trying to figure out what virtue is, Socrates progressively establishes a certain identification between virtue and knowledge. Virtue is referred as epistēme, sophia or technē, giving rise to several interpretations of its nature and the knowledge in which it consists, and frequently entailing a leading understanding of virtue, among others, as a propositional knowledge or as a skill. In this context, I will hold that using Socrates interchangeably these wording to grasp what virtue is, a linguistical analysis on this interchangeability conveys to an understanding of virtue as a plural and inclusive knowledge, entailing a non-exclusive sense. Analyzing the interchangeability of words on which Socrates designates virtue and the proper semantic field that it entails – revealing semantic properties like common conceptual evolution, overlapping significances and shared identity –, I will argue that assuming fully this moral language determines the suitable coordinates that a philosophical understanding of Socratic virtue is able to assume, and on which it would be conveniently taken forward. I will hold that it is not only possible to assume Socratic virtue as a plural-integrative and non-excluding knowledge on the existent textual basis and Socratic Dialogues passages and their non-opposition each other –like some interpreters suggest –, but on the very same words and their interchangeable use by which Socrates tries to capture what virtue is and on which the diversity of epistēmes’ senses are apprehended.
Nota de contenido:	Introducción -- Terminología de la virtud e intercambiabilidad -- Lenguaje moral y naturaleza de la virtud socrática -- Conclusión.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101803

[artículo] El lenguaje moral en los diálogos socráticos [texto impreso] / Vianney Domingo . - 2022 . - p. 249-271.
Idioma : Español
in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 249-271

Temas:	CONOCIMIENTO FILOSOFIA GRIEGA SOCRATES VIRTUDES
Resumen:	In the Socratic Dialogues, as it is well known, trying to figure out what virtue is, Socrates progressively establishes a certain identification between virtue and knowledge. Virtue is referred as epistēme, sophia or technē, giving rise to several interpretations of its nature and the knowledge in which it consists, and frequently entailing a leading understanding of virtue, among others, as a propositional knowledge or as a skill. In this context, I will hold that using Socrates interchangeably these wording to grasp what virtue is, a linguistical analysis on this interchangeability conveys to an understanding of virtue as a plural and inclusive knowledge, entailing a non-exclusive sense. Analyzing the interchangeability of words on which Socrates designates virtue and the proper semantic field that it entails – revealing semantic properties like common conceptual evolution, overlapping significances and shared identity –, I will argue that assuming fully this moral language determines the suitable coordinates that a philosophical understanding of Socratic virtue is able to assume, and on which it would be conveniently taken forward. I will hold that it is not only possible to assume Socratic virtue as a plural-integrative and non-excluding knowledge on the existent textual basis and Socratic Dialogues passages and their non-opposition each other –like some interpreters suggest –, but on the very same words and their interchangeable use by which Socrates tries to capture what virtue is and on which the diversity of epistēmes’ senses are apprehended.
Nota de contenido:	Introducción -- Terminología de la virtud e intercambiabilidad -- Lenguaje moral y naturaleza de la virtud socrática -- Conclusión.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101803

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 273-296

Título :	¿Es el lenguaje tecnología? : análisis de un argumento transhumanista
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Zaida Espinosa Zarate
Fecha de publicación:	2022
Artículo en la página:	p. 273-296
Idioma :	Español
Temas:	LENGUAJE TECNOLOGIA TRANSHUMANISMO
Resumen:	One of the arguments on which the transhumanist project relies is based on a consideration of the technical nature of humans, particularly, on the idea that what human beings are is a pure result of the techniques they have: «They do not exist but through the devices they have and that they can control to a certain extent» (Hottois, 2015, p. 183). On this basis, it is stated that the legitimacy of the use of human enhancement technologies is the same as that of other devices used in the evolutionary process, so that the division between two qualitatively different enhancement methods –natural or intrinsic, and artificial and extrinsic– is untenable. We analyze the argument, which is based on the assumption, that we will question, that language is a tool just as other devices: «There are good reasons to consider […] language itself as technology» (Meacham, 2017, p. 2; Clark, 2003). We look into the transhumanist idea of language as a tool that has been shaped in the evolutionary process for adaptation purposes, and of its identification with other tools: just as we consider that language – that has merged with ourselves, resulting in physical and cognitive changes – is not alien to the human condition, the same can be said of our enhancement technologies: all of them share the same technical nature and provide ways of accessing the real that affect our knowledge of it. We conclude that the term ‘tool’ is used in a very broad sense when applied to language. This is so not just because language cannot be explained based solely on experience – since this fails to explain its genetic factor –, but also because this idea results in a technification of human experience: what thinking would mean at each time – and, consequently, what we would know – would be totally determined by the tools we had, so that there would not be any transcendence of thought over these. We conclude that this results in an impoverished conception of knowledge.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101804

[artículo] ¿Es el lenguaje tecnología? : análisis de un argumento transhumanista [texto impreso] / Zaida Espinosa Zarate . - 2022 . - p. 273-296.
Idioma : Español
in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 273-296

Temas:	LENGUAJE TECNOLOGIA TRANSHUMANISMO
Resumen:	One of the arguments on which the transhumanist project relies is based on a consideration of the technical nature of humans, particularly, on the idea that what human beings are is a pure result of the techniques they have: «They do not exist but through the devices they have and that they can control to a certain extent» (Hottois, 2015, p. 183). On this basis, it is stated that the legitimacy of the use of human enhancement technologies is the same as that of other devices used in the evolutionary process, so that the division between two qualitatively different enhancement methods –natural or intrinsic, and artificial and extrinsic– is untenable. We analyze the argument, which is based on the assumption, that we will question, that language is a tool just as other devices: «There are good reasons to consider […] language itself as technology» (Meacham, 2017, p. 2; Clark, 2003). We look into the transhumanist idea of language as a tool that has been shaped in the evolutionary process for adaptation purposes, and of its identification with other tools: just as we consider that language – that has merged with ourselves, resulting in physical and cognitive changes – is not alien to the human condition, the same can be said of our enhancement technologies: all of them share the same technical nature and provide ways of accessing the real that affect our knowledge of it. We conclude that the term ‘tool’ is used in a very broad sense when applied to language. This is so not just because language cannot be explained based solely on experience – since this fails to explain its genetic factor –, but also because this idea results in a technification of human experience: what thinking would mean at each time – and, consequently, what we would know – would be totally determined by the tools we had, so that there would not be any transcendence of thought over these. We conclude that this results in an impoverished conception of knowledge.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101804

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 297-317

Título :	Post-phronetic pain
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Fecha de publicación:	2022
Artículo en la página:	p. 297-317
Idioma :	Inglés
Temas:	EMOCIONES FILOSOFIA ARISTOTELICA MORAL SABIDURIA TRISTEZA
Resumen:	The aim of this article is to refute the standard assumption in Aristotelian virtue theory that a fully phronetic decision is characterised by psychological unity and freedom from ambivalent emotions eliciting post-phronetic pain (PPP). After introducing the topic, the second section rehearses the structure of an argument showing that the absence of non-optimal emotions after a phronetic decision creates a mystery for Aristotelian virtue theory. The third section examines four different (but ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to save Aristotle’s face, by defanging the non-PPP assumption from within his virtue theory. The fourth section delineates the nature of the PPP by arguing that it comprises a number of distinguishable emotions of moral sadness. The final section probes a number of resources within neo-Aristotelian theory that would allow us to reconceptualise PPP as beneficial to a certain extent, without fetishising it as a pure blessing in disguise.
Nota de contenido:	Introduction -- The mistery of the missing motivation -- Some possible aristotelian rejoinders -- Types of moral sadness -- Does PPP have any redeeming features? -- Acknowledgments.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101805

[artículo] Post-phronetic pain [texto impreso] . - 2022 . - p. 297-317.
Idioma : Inglés
in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 297-317

Temas:	EMOCIONES FILOSOFIA ARISTOTELICA MORAL SABIDURIA TRISTEZA
Resumen:	The aim of this article is to refute the standard assumption in Aristotelian virtue theory that a fully phronetic decision is characterised by psychological unity and freedom from ambivalent emotions eliciting post-phronetic pain (PPP). After introducing the topic, the second section rehearses the structure of an argument showing that the absence of non-optimal emotions after a phronetic decision creates a mystery for Aristotelian virtue theory. The third section examines four different (but ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to save Aristotle’s face, by defanging the non-PPP assumption from within his virtue theory. The fourth section delineates the nature of the PPP by arguing that it comprises a number of distinguishable emotions of moral sadness. The final section probes a number of resources within neo-Aristotelian theory that would allow us to reconceptualise PPP as beneficial to a certain extent, without fetishising it as a pure blessing in disguise.
Nota de contenido:	Introduction -- The mistery of the missing motivation -- Some possible aristotelian rejoinders -- Types of moral sadness -- Does PPP have any redeeming features? -- Acknowledgments.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101805

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022)

Título :	Intelecto e inmortalidad e Aristóteles, Alejandro de Afrodisias y Tomás de Aquino
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Thomas Rego
Fecha de publicación:	2022
Idioma :	Español
Resumen:	Given that the intellect is capable of knowing the intelligible and, thus, is immaterial, and taken into consideration the principle that agere sequitur esse, philosophers have discussed for centuries whether the soul is immortal. Aristotle stresses that if the soul is capable of operating without the body, it will be capable of being without it. However, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Aquinas differ deeply here. For Alexander, the material intellect operates through the body and only achieves the intelligible aided by the agent intellect, which comes from outside. Therefore, when the body corrupts, both its matter and soul are no more. For Aquinas, every being must completely possess the formal principles of its operations, and, as the intellect has an operation in which it does not communicate with the body, the human intellect is not destroyed by death.
Nota de contenido:	Introducción -- La naturaleza del alma humana en Aristóteles -- La naturaleza del alma humana en el De anima de Alejandro de Afrodisias -- El sentido íntegro de la naturaleza del alma en Sto. Tomás de Aquino -- Conclusión.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101806

[artículo] Intelecto e inmortalidad e Aristóteles, Alejandro de Afrodisias y Tomás de Aquino [texto impreso] / Thomas Rego . - 2022.
Idioma : Español
in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022)

Resumen:	Given that the intellect is capable of knowing the intelligible and, thus, is immaterial, and taken into consideration the principle that agere sequitur esse, philosophers have discussed for centuries whether the soul is immortal. Aristotle stresses that if the soul is capable of operating without the body, it will be capable of being without it. However, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Aquinas differ deeply here. For Alexander, the material intellect operates through the body and only achieves the intelligible aided by the agent intellect, which comes from outside. Therefore, when the body corrupts, both its matter and soul are no more. For Aquinas, every being must completely possess the formal principles of its operations, and, as the intellect has an operation in which it does not communicate with the body, the human intellect is not destroyed by death.
Nota de contenido:	Introducción -- La naturaleza del alma humana en Aristóteles -- La naturaleza del alma humana en el De anima de Alejandro de Afrodisias -- El sentido íntegro de la naturaleza del alma en Sto. Tomás de Aquino -- Conclusión.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101806

[artículo] 
inActa Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 343-366

Título :	Antropología trascendental y filiación
Tipo de documento:	texto impreso
Autores:	Juan Fernando Selles Dauder
Fecha de publicación:	2022
Artículo en la página:	p. 343-366
Idioma :	Italiano
Resumen:	In this work is studied, according to Leonardo Polo, the filial character of the personal trascendentals that make the personal act of being with respect to the divine being: free coexistence, personal knowing and personal love. In each of them, two dimensions are distinguished: native freedom and of recipient, search of origin and recipient, accepting and giving, noting that these dimensions are filial.
Nota de contenido:	Doble planteamiento: desde una pincelada de biografía intelectual y desde la filiación divina -- La libertad filial de la persona humana -- El conocer filial de la persona humana -- El amar filial de la persona humana -- Conclusiones.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101807

[artículo] Antropología trascendental y filiación [texto impreso] / Juan Fernando Selles Dauder . - 2022 . - p. 343-366.
Idioma : Italiano
in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 343-366

Resumen:	In this work is studied, according to Leonardo Polo, the filial character of the personal trascendentals that make the personal act of being with respect to the divine being: free coexistence, personal knowing and personal love. In each of them, two dimensions are distinguished: native freedom and of recipient, search of origin and recipient, accepting and giving, noting that these dimensions are filial.
Nota de contenido:	Doble planteamiento: desde una pincelada de biografía intelectual y desde la filiación divina -- La libertad filial de la persona humana -- El conocer filial de la persona humana -- El amar filial de la persona humana -- Conclusiones.
Enlace permanente a este registro:	https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101807