[artículo] | Título : | Post-phronetic pain | | Tipo de documento: | texto impreso | | Fecha de publicación: | 2022 | | Artículo en la página: | p. 297-317 | | Idioma : | Inglés | | Temas: | EMOCIONES
FILOSOFIA ARISTOTELICA
MORAL
SABIDURIA
TRISTEZA
| | Resumen: | The aim of this article is to refute the standard assumption in Aristotelian virtue theory that a fully phronetic decision is characterised by psychological unity and freedom from ambivalent emotions eliciting post-phronetic pain (PPP). After introducing the topic, the second section rehearses the structure of an argument showing that the absence of non-optimal emotions after a phronetic decision creates a mystery for Aristotelian virtue theory. The third section examines four different (but ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to save Aristotle’s face, by defanging the non-PPP assumption from within his virtue theory. The fourth section delineates the nature of the PPP by arguing that it comprises a number of distinguishable emotions of moral sadness. The final section probes a number of resources within neo-Aristotelian theory that would allow us to reconceptualise PPP as beneficial to a certain extent, without fetishising it as a pure blessing in disguise. | | Nota de contenido: | Introduction -- The mistery of the missing motivation -- Some possible aristotelian rejoinders -- Types of moral sadness -- Does PPP have any redeeming features? -- Acknowledgments. | | Enlace permanente a este registro: | https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101805 |
in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 297-317
[artículo] Post-phronetic pain [texto impreso] . - 2022 . - p. 297-317. Idioma : Inglés in Acta Philosophica > v.31, n.2 (2022) . - p. 297-317 | Temas: | EMOCIONES
FILOSOFIA ARISTOTELICA
MORAL
SABIDURIA
TRISTEZA
| | Resumen: | The aim of this article is to refute the standard assumption in Aristotelian virtue theory that a fully phronetic decision is characterised by psychological unity and freedom from ambivalent emotions eliciting post-phronetic pain (PPP). After introducing the topic, the second section rehearses the structure of an argument showing that the absence of non-optimal emotions after a phronetic decision creates a mystery for Aristotelian virtue theory. The third section examines four different (but ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to save Aristotle’s face, by defanging the non-PPP assumption from within his virtue theory. The fourth section delineates the nature of the PPP by arguing that it comprises a number of distinguishable emotions of moral sadness. The final section probes a number of resources within neo-Aristotelian theory that would allow us to reconceptualise PPP as beneficial to a certain extent, without fetishising it as a pure blessing in disguise. | | Nota de contenido: | Introduction -- The mistery of the missing motivation -- Some possible aristotelian rejoinders -- Types of moral sadness -- Does PPP have any redeeming features? -- Acknowledgments. | | Enlace permanente a este registro: | https://opac.um.edu.uy/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101805 |
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